Matthias

There exists no such thing as a perfect anonymity network with low latency, low bandwith consumption which provides strong anonymity. Popular anonymisation networks rightfully focus on Web browsing, because that is the most popular application on todays Internet. The most popular anonymisation network is, rightfully so, Tor. You might, however, not have the requirements that mandate the use of the Tor network and thus are looking for alternatives. In this talk, we present alternatives to the popular Tor anonymisation network and examine what they achieve and how they differ.

With the popularity of the Web came the popularity of anonymisation communication networks (ACNs) catering for the Web context. That means in particular low latency. Generally, though, anonymisation networks can be classified by different properties such as anonymity goals, strength of adversary or application area. In this talk we present alternative ACNs to the popular Tor network and their goals. We explain their architectures, properties, and how they achieve anonymity. In particular, we will look at JonDonym, I2P, Freenet, and GNUnet as well as ongoing research projects such as Loopix, Vuvuzela, and Riffle. We will see that once you understand your requirements, you can optimise your choice of anonymisation networks according to your needs.

Other people: Tobias Mueller Erik

On October 1st the Catalan society held a referendum to decide if they wanted to stay part of the Spanish state or create an independent state. This talk will explain the internet censorship which took place in the weeks before the referendum, on the very same day as well as in the timer after the referendum.

The talk will focus on the methods used by the state to carry out the censorship. These included websites informing about the referendum and information about the polling station each citizen had to use. I will describe how the censorship got circumvented and give an insight in the systems developed to facilitate an easy cloning of the information. On the day of the referendum it was expected that the Spanish police will close down polling stations. Therefor a global census accessible via internet was introduced which allowed the vote at any polling station. I will describe how this global census was organised to block people from voting twice. I will explain in which different ways the census got attacked by the Spanish state. And of course what we can learn from the state censorship to create more resilient infrastructures.