👥 2 conferences
🎤 2 talks
📅 Years active: 2013 to 2015
No biography available.
2 known conferences
Using the recent BREACH exploit as an example, I will present how to represent attacks and security notions within the Type Theory of Agda.
Using security notions such as semantic security (IND-CPA
, IND-CCA
), it is intuitive to show how the use of compression leads to a not semantically secure encryption, and thus potential issues. Indeed the length of the ciphertext can now be controlled by the adversary who can control the plaintext. I will show how this intuitive result can be formalized using Agda.
A note on Agda: It is both a programming language and a proof system. The programming language features pure, exhaustive, and terminating functions over rich user defined data types (inductive and co-inductive). This powerful λ-calculus is equipped with a rich type-system featuring dependent-types. Through the Curry-Howard correspondence this programming language can also be used as a proof system. With such a combined system it becomes possible to write programs and proofs about these programs in a unified way. Additionally using this approach, one can start proving properties starting only with programming skills and gradually learn more proof techniques by exploring the type system.
I claim that functional programming and dependent types can be of a great help to formalize cryptography and thus privacy enhancing tools. I will present how functions are convenient at describing these games and adversaries. I will also give an overview of the crypto-agda project: how type-isomorphisms can ease probabilistic reasoning; how circuits can help capturing the requirements on the complexity bounds; and how all of these aspects can fit together thanks to polymorphism!