Jo Van Bulck

Thank you all for coming to this year's devroom and hopefully see you in the next years!

Other people: Fabiano Fidêncio Fritz Alder

Inaugural secure enclave platforms operate at the single user process level (e.g. SGX), meaning a single address space with potentially multiple threads, with a standard OS outside the enclave responsible for resource management and scheduling. More recent platforms (AMD SEV, Intel TDX, AWS Nitro Enclaves) operate at the VM level. This provides significant new capabilities for multi-process abstractions such as mmap and fork, which will be beneficial for enclavizing legacy software.

However, taking a VM image and running it in an enclave is not great from a TCB minimization standpoint. For platforms where there's currently no alternative (AMD, AWS), how can we build--with a minimal TCB--an abstraction that's similar to single-process enclaves? Of course you can “just run Linux” with a single process but this again is clearly suboptimal. We'll explore the solution space in this interactive session.

Other people: Marta Rybczynska Vasily A. Sartakov Mike Bursell Jethro G. Beekman Hugo Lefeuvre

A brief introduction to the room and to the sessions.

This year's TEE devroom will again be a full-day virtual event with an impressive lineup! The day will be roughly divided into session blocks grouping related talks as follows:

10h00-12h25: TEE attacks, defenses, and enclave shielding runtimes

featuring an enclave exploit analysis, Guardian, Gramine, Enarx, and Veracruz

13h25-14h40: Emerging TEEs and best practices

featuring logging in confidential computing, secure boot, and ARM CCA

14h55-16h10: OS and and page-based isolation

featuring FlexOS, Intravisor, and EDP for AWS Nitro

16h30-17h30: Wrap up and discussion on process-based abstractions for VM-based environments

we wrap up the day with a live presentation and a following discussion

Other people: Vasily A. Sartakov Fritz Alder

A brief introduction to the room and to the sessions.

This year's TEE devroom will be a full-day virtual event with an impressive lineup! The day will be roughly divided into session blocks grouping related talks as follows:

10h00-12h35: Enclave shielding runtimes and programming paradigms

featuring Enarx, VeraCruz, OpenEnclave, Graphene-SGX, Rust-EDP, and Sancus

12h35-13h30: Lunch break & buffer 😋

13h30-14h45: Attacks and reverse engineering

featuring VoltPillager, SEV-ES, and ARM Secure Boot

14h45-15h00: Coffee break & buffer ☕️

15h00-16h40: Emerging RISC-V TEEs

featuring Penglai, Keystone, TEEP, and Trusted RV

16h40-16h50: Coffee break & buffer ☕️

16h50-18h00: Alternative trusted-hardware extensions

featuring CHERI, Cubicle OS, and HLS

This talk analyzes the vulnerability space arising in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) when interfacing a trusted enclave application with untrusted, potentially malicious code. Considerable research and industry effort has gone into developing TEE runtime libraries with the purpose of transparently shielding enclave application code from an adversarial environment. However, our analysis reveals that shielding requirements are generally not well-understood in real-world TEE runtime implementations. We expose several sanitization vulnerabilities at the level of the Application Binary Interface (ABI) and the Application Programming Interface (API) that can lead to exploitable memory safety and side-channel vulnerabilities in the compiled enclave. Mitigation of these vulnerabilities is not as simple as ensuring that pointers are outside enclave memory. In fact, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art mitigation techniques such as Intel’s edger8r, Microsoft’s “deep copy marshalling”, or even memory-safe languages like Rust fail to fully eliminate this attack surface. Our analysis reveals 35 enclave interface sanitization vulnerabilities in 8 major open-source shielding frameworks for Intel SGX, RISC-V, and Sancus TEEs. We practically exploit these vulnerabilities in several attack scenarios to leak secret keys from the enclave or enable remote code reuse. We have responsibly disclosed our findings, leading to 5 designated CVE records and numerous security patches in the vulnerable open-source projects, including the Intel SGX-SDK, Microsoft Open Enclave, Google Asylo, and the Rust compiler.

Please note that this talk was originally scheduled to begin at the later time of 13:00