Daniel Smith

It has been well established that the integrity of critical systems must be rooted in the launch. Early works such as the Xoar architecture demonstrated the need for virtualized environments to begin with a lightweight, restricted bootstrap from which isolation of PCI management could be established. Since that time, knowledge of real IOMMU implementations and how to leverage them for system integrity has evolved. In this presentation, the new Hyperlaunch capability for starting hypervisors will be presented with a short discussion of the Xen implementation. The talk will progress to a discussion of how Hyperlaunch is connected with TrenchBoot (Linux Secure Launch) and Mandatory Access Control communication fabrics. With a focus on how it enables dedicated PCI management constructs that can provide secure and trustworthy isolation for PCI devices, with the potential for CXL devices. The talk will close with an open discussion on how hypervisors might unify around a common approach for IOMMU management.

There is existing work in the public space on how to correctly construct a DRTM launch but not an equivalent amount on how to maintain the integrity of the DRTM launch over the lifecycle of a system. In particular a specific area of concern is how to correctly construct a secure upgrade for the DRTM launch that minimizes the risk of the process being corrupted. There are a few challenges that must be overcome and in this presentation these will be covered along with a novel approach that will address the challenges.

Other people: Marek Kasiewicz Brian Payne